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The Seller Fiddles and the Clock Ticks: Seller's Cure
and the U.C.C. Statute of Limitations
Jacqueline R. Kanovitz *
When a warranted product fails to perform satisfactorily,
before initiating litigation a buyer may allow the seller to attempt
repair. In some instances, the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C." or the "Code") forces a buyer to take this intermediate
step. Article II of the U.C.C. encourages parties "to work out their
differences and so to minimize losses resulting from defective per-
formance." 1 In addition, commercial contracts often make repair
or replacement of defective parts the buyer's exclusive remedy.
Such contract provisions obligate a buyer to accept repair. More
often, however, a buyer's self-interest dictates acceptance of the of-
fered repair solutions. Litigation is expensive and time-consuming.
Moreover, litigation forces the buyer to choose between an immedi-
ate repair or replacement cost or prolonged inconvenience and ad-
ditional loss from an unrepaired product. For these and other
reasons, a buyer may postpone legal action until the seller's repairs
have failed.
Section 2-7252 of the Code adopts a short four year statute of
limitations for actions on contracts for the sale of goods. Buyers
* Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law; B.A. 1967,J.D. 1967, Uni-
versity of Louisville.
1 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 8-2, at 299 n.23 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
2 U.C.C. § 2-725 (1977) provides in full:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of the action has accrued. By the original agreement the
parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not
extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when
tender of delivery is made except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future
performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such
performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (I) is
so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach
such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and
within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination
resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to
prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations
nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this Act becomes
effective.
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with time-barred claims need legal theories to translate lost cure
time into relief from the Code's limitations statute. The variety of
possible fact patterns necessitates different legal theories to accom-
modate each buyer's situation. Some contracts contain an exclusive
repair remedy provision. Buyers under such contracts need differ-
ent legal theories from buyers who, after discovering the seller's
breach, voluntarily consent to proposed repair solutions. Even
among buyers who voluntarily accept repairs, factual differences re-
quire adjustments in the applicable legal theory.
This article presents four theories to lift a section 2-725 time-
bar from a suit filed more than four years after delivery if the
seller's ineffective cure consumed a portion of the limitations pe-
riod. First, the article considers section 2-725's future performance
warranty exception. This exception postpones accrual until the
seller's breach of warranty is or should have been discovered.3 Sec-
ond, this article argues that neither a time-of-tender nor a time-of-
discovery accrual date is appropriate for contracts with exclusive
repair remedy provisions. The correct application of section 2-725
to such contracts requires postponement of accrual until the exclu-
sive repair remedy has failed of its essential purpose and the buyer
is free to pursue a legal remedy. 4 Third, this article discusses es-
toppel for cases with ongoing cure at the end of the limitations pe-
riod where the seller then induces the buyer to delay legal action
with assurances of impending success.5 Finally, this article consid-
ers tolling, sanctioned under section 2-725(4), where cure failed
earlier in the limitations period or where the seller gave no
assurances. 6
Contemporary section 2-725 analysis has developed with re-
markably little sensitivity to Article II's cure policy. A buyer's re-
quest for greater attention to this policy will be strengthened by
demonstrating that altering the normal limitations period after a
failed cure will not conflict with the policies underlying section
2-725.
I. Promoting Article II Cure Policy Without Sacrificing
Section 2-725 Concerns
A. Article H Cure Policies
Encouraging loss minimization through repair solutions in
commercial controversies represents a dominant Code theme. This
3 See text accompanying notes 17-33 infra.
4 See text accompanying notes 34-48 infra.
5 See text accompanying notes 49-83 infra.
6 See text accompanying notes 84-98 infra.
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policy is expressed in section 2-508's 7 pioneering concept of
''cure," a legal device which enables a seller to override a buyer's
rejection of the goods. When a buyer rejects non-conforming
goods, the seller may use the time remaining in the contract per-
formance period to make a conforming tender. Even though the
time for performance has expired, if the seller was ignorant of the
non-conformity8 or if the rejection otherwise came as a surprise,9
the seller has additional time to cure the non-conformity.
10
Section 2-508 does not authorize a seller to force cure on a
buyer who has accepted the goods and then demands a post-accept-
ance legal remedy.1 ' Yet, to promote voluntary dispute resolution,
the U.C.C. contains numerous assurances that a buyer who cooper-
ates with a seller's unsuccessful repair efforts will not lose impor-
7 U.C.C. § 2-508 (1977) reads:
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because non-con-
forming and the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may seasona-
bly notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the contract time
make a conforming delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller had
reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allow-
ance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable
time to substitute a conforming tender.
8 For cases holding that a seller's good faith ignorance of the non-conformity satisfies
the § 2-508(2) requirement that the seller have reasonable grounds to believe that his
tender would be acceptable, see Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. 1967); Zabriskie
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968); see also WHITE & SUM-
MERS, supra note I, § 8-4, at 322.
9 U.C.C. § 2-508 comment 2 (1977).
10 Cure under § 2-508 requires the seller to substitute a "conforming tender." In the
case of defective new goods that have been rejected, cure can be accomplished by repair, as
opposed to replacement, only when the defect can be corrected by minor repairs or adjust-
ments capable of being made without undue inconvenience to the buyer. See note 8 supra.
Repair solutions, however, take on increased importance in post-acceptance legal contro-
versies when the goods have been used before their non-conformity is discovered.
Several additional sections make cure mandatory before the buyer can seek his legal
remedies. Section 2-612(2), regulating installment contracts, prevents the buyer from re-
jecting a tendered non-conforming installment if the defect is curable and the seller season-
ably offers cure. Section 2-608(1)(a) precludes a buyer who accepts non-conforming goods
knowing of the non-conformity from revoking his acceptance unless he accepted on the
reasonable assumption that the non-conformity would be cured and his expectations have
gone unrealized. Finally, § 2-605(l)(a) effectuates the seller's § 2-508 right of cure by bar-
ring a buyer, who in his rejection notice fails to state curable defects ascertainable by rea-
sonable inspection, from obtaining any remedy for the unstated defects.
I I The seller's § 2-508 right to cure, by its terms, applies only when the buyer rejects
the seller's non-conforming tender. When the buyer accepts the goods, but later seeks to
revoke his acceptance or asserts a claim for damages, courts have declined to apply § 2-508
by analogy and force the buyer to accept cure as a substitute for the right to a judicial
remedy. See, e.g., Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., 304 N.W.2d 654, 657
(Minn. 1981) (en banc); Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc., 117 N.H. 85, 90, 370
A.2d 270, 274 (1977); Gappelberg v. Landrum, 666 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1984) (replacement
offered rather than repairs). Though the Code does not force buyers with grounds for
post-acceptance legal remedies to accept cure solutions offered by their sellers, Article II at
numerous points fosters voluntary cooperation to achieve this end. See note 13 infra.
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tant remedial rights. Specifically, the buyer retains his right to
revoke an acceptance of seriously non-conforming goods if he ac-
cepts them on the reasonable but unfulfilled assumption that cure
will later materialize.' 2 Nor will a buyer be penalized for delaying
any required post-breach notifications if cure efforts are continu-
ing.'3 The Code's emphasis on cure solutions should be translated
into limitations concessions for victims of failed cures unless pro-
tecting the buyer would conflict with section 2-725's policies.
B. Section 2-725 Policies
Generally, limitations acts have two purposes: to avoid "stale-
ness" and to protect transactional repose. 14 The first justification
reflects the belief that "stale" evidence hampers a court's differenti-
12 U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(a) (1977).
13 Before asserting post-acceptance legal remedies, the buyer must notify the seller
within a reasonable time after he discovers grounds for the assertion. U.C.C. §§ 2-
607(3)(a), 2-608(2) (1977). Professors White and Summers identified the policies support-
ing this requirement:
The first and most important reason for requiring notice is to enable the seller to
make adjustments or replacements or to suggest opportunities for cure to the end
of minimizing the buyer's loss and reducing the seller's own liability to the
buyer. . . .The second policy behind the notice requirement is to afford the seller
an opportunity to arm himself for negotiation and litigation. . . . A final, and less
important policy behind the notice requirement is to give the defendant the same
kind of mind balm he gets from the statute of limitation. There is some value in
allowing a seller, at some point, to close his books on goods sold in the past and to
pass on to other things.
WHITE & SUMMERS, note 1 supra, § 11-10, at 421-22.
Having identified these policies, White and Summers believe that formal notice, even
though given long after the sale, should be considered timely "if there has been a continu-
ing series of complaints, negotiations, and attempted repairs." Id. at § 8-3, at 312. Courts,
reflecting this view, consistently disregard the period when the seller is attempting cure in
determining whether the buyer complied with the timeliness requirement for giving notice.
See, e.g., Dopieralla v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 255 Ark. 150, 152, 499 S.W.2d 610, 611 (1973)
(notice of revocation timely even though given 40 months after sale where seller repeatedly
assured buyer that malfunction would be corrected); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc.,
262 N.W.2d 349, 353 n.4 (Minn. 1977) (notice of revocation given 9 months and 6300
miles after sale timely where cure was ongoing); Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Machine &
Foundry Co., 125 NJ. Super. 251, 256, 310 A.2d 491,494 (1973) (two years may not be an
unreasonable delay in giving notice where delay induced by seller's assurances that defect
would be cured).
The integration of cure considerations into determinations of whether notice was
timely is important for another reason. Substantial overlap exists between the policies that
limitations acts seek to promote by timely suit, see text accompanying notes 14-16 infra, and
those policies identified above that the requirement of timely notice of the breach serves.
Consistent treatment in limitations cases requires that courts incorporate greater sensitivity
to cure policies than limitations decisions have heretofore given.
14 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118 (1979); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donald-
son, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); Kittinger v. Boeing Co., 21 Wash. App. 484, 486-87, 585
P.2d 812, 814 (1978). For cases providing insight into the policies underlying § 2-725, see
Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (D. Del. 1983); Engleman v.
Eastern Light Co., 30 Pa. D & C.2d 38, 44-46 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1962).
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ation between a meritorious and a spurious claim. Hence, limita-
tions acts force a litigant to advance his claim before evidence has
been lost, memories have faded, and facts have become obscured
by time.
Limitations acts, however, are poorly crafted to implement this
first goal. Unlike statutes of frauds, similarly concerned with the
genuineness of claims, limitations acts disregard the reliability or
unreliability of the particular evidence supporting the claim.
"Staleness" is deemed to result from the passage of time alone.
Transactional security presents a more compelling reason to
bar delayed claims. Even if a "stale" claim is just, fairness dictates
that a party without notice of a dispute should not have to defend
that transaction years later. As Professor Dawson has noted:
Even when clear and convincing evidence is available, the asser-
tion of a claim should not be postponed too long. Conduct pro-
ceeds on the assumption that a claim withheld from suit has
been abandoned; new relationships are gradually built up; to
disturb or disentangle them after a considerable lapse of time is
socially undesirable.
1 5
Moreover, the drafters of Article II highlighted this second
consideration in the explanation of the four year limitations period.
The drafters stated:
This Article takes sales contracts out of the general law limiting
the time for commencing contractual actions and selects a four
year period as the most appropriate to modem business prac-
tices. This is within the normal record keeping period.
16
Allowing businessmen to close their books and destroy their
records on a transaction confers a considerable commercial advan-
tage. The transactional repose policy, nevertheless, becomes less
persuasive if the seller is alerted during the limitations period to the
existence of a controversy. In such cases, the seller cannot possibly
regard the transaction as closed or run the risk of destroying his
records. Timely notice of the buyer's complaint satisfies the con-
cerns underlying section 2-725's emphasis on timely suits. Courts,
therefore, should avoid strictly applying section 2-725's four year
limitations period and instead should adopt solutions to effectuate
Article II's cure policy.
II. Theories To Lift Section 2-725 Time-Bars
From Cure Victims
This section presents four theories to lift a time-bar from a
breach of warranty claim: 1) the future performance warranty ex-
15 Dawson, Estoppel and the Statutes of Limitations, 34 MICH. L. REv. 1, 4 (1935).
16 U.C.C. § 2-725 comment (1977).
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ception; 2) special rules for contracts with exclusive repair reme-
dies; 3) estoppel to assert section 2-725; and 4) repair tolling. Of
the four theories offered in this article to extend the normal limita-
tions period, the future performance warranty exception has been
narrowly interpreted and thus offers the least promise.
A. Future Performance Warranty Exception
Section 2-725 adopts a four year limitations period beginning
when the contract is breached. Section 2-725(2) contains special
rules that establish when breach of warranty claims accrue:
A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made,
except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future perform-
ance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the
time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the
breach is or should have been discovered.'
7
Most warranties contain some assurance about the product's
capabilities and future performance. Even the implied warranty of
merchantability promises that in ordinary use the goods will per-
form comparably to similar goods available on the market. 18 Nev-
ertheless, courts have rarely applied the future performance
warranty exception.
The chief obstacle to a broad application of the future per-
formance warranty exception has been the interpretation of "ex-
plicitly" in section 2-725(2). Courts have interpreted "explicitly"
to require that the seller make express assurances in plain, clear
and unambiguous language about the product's future perform-
ance.' 9 This requirement eliminates causes of action based on im-
plied warranties; courts have uniformly excluded implied
warranties from the future performance exception.2 0 Courts have
not recognized buyers' reasonable expectations that a product
would last longer than four years after delivery. 2' Courts have also
ignored evidence that the product's flaw was not inherently discov-
erable until the product was used.2 2 Because the four year limita-
17 U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1977) (emphasis added). For the full text of § 2-725, see note 2
supra.
18 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1977).
19 See Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay Prod. Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d 411,413, 343 N.E.2d 530,
532 (1976); Wilson v. Massey-Furguson, Inc., 21 111. App. 3d 867, 871-72, 315 N.E.2d 580,
583 (1974).
20 See, e.g., Wright v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 358 So. 2d 444,445-46 (Ala. 1978); General
Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 352, 516 S.W.2d 602, 605-06 (1974); Beckmire v.
Ristokrat Clay Prod. Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d 411, 413, 343 N.E.2d 530, 532 (1976).
21 See Beckmire, 36 Ill. App. 3d at 413, 343 N.E. 2d at 532.
22 See Tomes v. Chrysler Corp., 60 Ill. App. 3d 707, 710, 377 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1978)
(boat with defective hull design and motor); Rutland v. Swift Chem. Co., 351 So. 2d 324
(Miss. 1977) (poor performance of fertilizer).
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tions period on implied warranties runs from delivery, a buyer
suing on an implied warranty should consider other theories for
altering the normal limitations period.
Even with express warranties, courts have narrowly applied the
future performance exception. 23 For an express warranty to fall
under this exception, the warranty must expressly cover not only
how the goods will perform in the future, but also how long the
goods will continue to perform.24 Under the prevailing test, the
express warranty must explicitly refer to a specific time period of
coverage: for example, one year, a lifetime, 1500 hours of use,
12,000 miles.
25
This test seems to echo the language of the standard new prod-
uct warranty used by the sellers and manufacturers of cars and simi-
lar products. The typical new product warranty contains language
similar to the following:
International Harvester Company warrants to the original pur-
chaser each item of new. . . equipment to be free from defects
in material and workmanship under normal use and service.
The obligation of the Company under this warranty is limited to
repairing or replacing as the Company may elect, free of charge
and without charge for installation, at the place of business of a
dealer of the Company authorized to handle the equipment cov-
ered by this warranty, any parts that prove in the Company's
23 Warranties dealing with the product's condition at the time of sale and its perform-
ance characteristics have generally been excluded from the future performance exception.
See, e.g., Binkley Corp. v. Teledyne Mid-Am. Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. Mo. 1971),
afd, 406 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972) (warranty that welder would be capable of performing a
precise number of welds per minute); Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545
P.2d 371 (1976) (typical new car warranty); Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
191 NJ. Super. 22, 465 A.2d 530 (1983) (warranty that product was designed to give long
and reliable service and that maintenance would be inexpensive). Commenting on the fu-
ture performance warranty exception, Professors White and Summers state:
[I]t should be clear that this extension of the normal warranty period does not
occur in the usual case, even though all warranties in a sense apply to the future
performance of goods. The quoted portion of [§] 2-725(2) applies only in a case
in which the warranty "explicitly extends to future performance." Presumably
such a case would be one in which the seller gave a "lifetime guarantee" or one in
which he, for example, expressly warranteed that an automobile would last for
24,000 miles or four years whichever occurred first.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 11-9, at 419.
24 See Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 820-21 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Binkley Corp., 333 F. Supp. at 1186-87.
25 Courts have found warranties qualifying under this test. See, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v.
Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 1983) (glass units "guaranteed for
period of twenty (20) years from date of manufacture" against moisture, film or dust collec-
tion resulting from failure of hermetic seal); Rempe v. General Elec. Co., 28 Conn. Supp.
160, 163, 254 A.2d 577, 578 (1969) ("lifetime" warranty on disposal unit); United States
Indus. v. Mitchell, 148 Ga. App. 770, 771, 252 S.E.2d 672, 673 (1979) (warranty that prod-
uct had been treated "to prevent rusting for a period of ten years"); Mittasch v. Seal Lock
Burial Vault, 42 A.D.2d 573, 574, 344 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102 (1973) (warranty that burial vault
would give "satisfactory service at all times").
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judgment, to be defective in material or workmanship within
twelve months or 1500 hours of use, whichever occurs first, after
delivery to the original purchaser.
THIS WARRANTY AND THE COMPANY'S OBLIGATION
HEREUNDER IS IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITA-
TION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANT-
ABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, all
other representations to the original purchaser and all other ob-
ligations or liabilities, including liability for incidental and con-
sequential damages on the part of the Company with respect to
the sale or use of the items warranted.
26
Although this warranty may appear to qualify for the future
performance exception, case law contradicts this conclusion.2 7
26 This warranty appears in Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 337,
581 P.2d 784, 795 (1978).
27 Courts have experienced acute difficulty in applying § 2-725 to contracts that make
repairs the buyer's exclusive remedy. In dealing with similar repair remedy provisions,
courts have ruled the buyer's cause of action accrues on any one of three different dates:
(1) when delivery is tendered, see Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys. Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261,
1265-66 (D. Del. 1983); Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 652, 545 P.2d 371,
378 (1976); Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 75 Mich. App. 169, 253 N.W.2d 696
(1977); Commissioners of Fire Dist. v. American La France, 176 NJ. Super. 566, 572-73,
424 A.2d 441, 444 (1980); Poppenheimer v. Bluff City Motor Homes, 658 S.W.2d 106, 111
(Tenn. App. 1983), (2) when the buyer discovers (or should have discovered) the seller's
breach of the underlying warranty, see, e.g., Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co.,
587 F.2d 813, 821 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979), and (3) when the seller
fails or refuses to live up to his repair promise, see Smith v. Union Supply Co., 675 P.2d 333,
335 (Colo. App. 1983); Space Leasing Assoc. v. Atlantic Bldg., Inc., 144 Ga. App. 320, 325,
241 S.E.2d 438, 440-41 (1977).
While most courts hold that the buyer's claim accrues on tender of delivery, they arrive
at this result from several directions. Some correctly observe that new product warranties
embody two distinct legal obligations, a warranty and a repair promise. See notes 28-29
infra and accompanying text. In applying § 2-725, however, these courts have ignored the
seller's broken repair promises and typically have focused exclusively on the warranty. See,
e.g., Centennial, 75 Mich. App. 169, 253 N.W. 2d 696; Poppenheimer, 658 S.W.2d 106. Be-
cause the seller's warranty that the goods are free from defects is not a future performance
warranty, this approach leads to a delivery accrual date. See note 23 supra and accompany-
ing text. Other courts paint themselves into the identical comer by confusing repair
promises with warranties. See notes 28-29 infra and accompanying text. Mistakenly charac-
terizing the seller's obligation as a "repair warranty," these courts, upon observing that the
seller's "repair warranty" relates to what he proposes to do, not to the future performance
of the goods, become forced to adopt tender accrual dates. See, e.g., Ontario Hydro, 569 F.
Supp. at 1264.
Some courts have stumbled upon the correct conclusion that the buyer's claim under
an exclusive repair remedy contract accrues when the seller fails to repair. See Union Supply
Co., 675 P.2d at 335; Space Leasing Associates, 144 Ga. App. at 325, 241 S.E.2d at 440-41.
These courts, nevertheless, have been unable to tie their intuitively correct hunches into
any § 2-725 language that will support them. They attempt to find justification under the
future performance warranty exception. The seller's repair promise is styled a future per-
formance "repair warranty" whose breach the buyer discovers when the seller fails or re-
fuses to repair. This analysis is so transparently flawed that even though these courts reach
sound conclusions, their opinions have been largely ignored. The seller's repair promise is
1985]
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Courts typically have reasoned that such "warranties" actually con-
tain two distinct promises: (1) a promise that the goods are free
from defects in material and workmanship under normal use and
service; and (2) a promise to repair part failures occurring within
the first twelve months or 1500 use hours after delivery. Only the
first undertaking qualifies as a "warranty" under section 2-313's
definition. 28 The second obligation, referring to a specific future
time or usage period, promises only a remedy that the buyer will
have if the goods fail to conform. 29 The seller's second promise
does not warrant the future performance of the goods. The seller has
not promised that the goods will perform satisfactorily for a year or
that the goods will not need repairs: he has agreed only to make
repairs free of charge during a specified time period.
This analysis usually has led courts dealing with similar new
product warranties to find that the buyer's claim accrues on tender
of delivery.30 Section 2-725(2)'s language refers only to warranties
extending to the product's future performance and does not in-
clude promises relating to future repairs. Thus, the dominant view
no warranty at all, much less one that explicitly relates to how the goods will perform in the
future. See notes 28-29 infra. The correct § 2-725 analysis for these contracts is developed
in Part II (B). See text accompanying notes 34-48 infra. For a comprehensive treatment of
this subject, see Kanovitz, Warranties with Exclusive Repair-and-Replacement Remedies: When Does
the Buyer's Cause of Action Accrue?, 1984 ARIz. ST. LJ. 431 [hereinafter cited as Kanovitz]. See
also Note, Action Accrual Date for Written Warranties to Repair: Date of Delivery or Date of Failure to
Repair?, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 713 (1984).
28 The seller's promise to repair part failures occurring during the first year is not a
warranty as defined by § 2-313 and is additionally disqualified by § 2-316(4). See note 29
infra. Under § 2-313(1)(a), the seller's affirmations of fact and promises which relate to the
goods and become part of the basis of the bargain create an express warranty that "the
goods will conform to the affirmation or promise." While the seller's repair promise in a
sense relates to the goods and may even become part of the basis of the bargain, this prom-
ise is incapable of being a warranty because the goods unaided can never conform to it. The
§ 2-313 definition limits warranty promises to those which relate to qualities, capabilities,
and other features that the goods are stated to possess. See Standard Alliance Indus., 587 F.2d
at 818 n.10; McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 425-26, 347 A.2d 253, 257
(1975).
29 That Article II requires a differentiation between warranties and repair promises is
not simply found in the § 2-313 definition. See note 28 supra. Anticipating that lawyers and
courts might tend to confuse remedy promises with warranties, the drafters attempted a
second time to avert this confusion. In § 2-316(4), they warn that disclaimers and contrac-
tual limitations on remedies are separate legal devices for insulating sellers from liability
because, by necessary inference, warranties and remedies are distinct under Article II. In
the commentary, they forcefully make this point:
This Article treats the limitation or avoidance of consequential damages as a mat-
ter of limiting remedies for breach, separate from the matter of creation of liability
under a warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 2 (1977).
Despite these warnings, courts applying § 2-725 to contracts with exclusive repair rem-
edies often exhibit a confusion that leads to selection of an incorrect accrual date. See note
27 supra.
30 See note 27 supra.
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is that the seller's repair promises do not affect the running of limi-
tations on a buyer's breach of warranty claim.31
In Standard Alliance Industries Inc. v. Black Clawson Co.,32 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found the pre-
vailing analysis too harsh and insensitive to buyers. The court com-
pared a warranty that the product would perform without
malfunction for one year, the remedy limited to repair, with one
promising that the product would be free from defects in material
and workmanship at delivery, but undertaking to repair defects for
one year.33 Finding no practical difference between the two, the
Sixth Circuit combined the seller's warranty and repair promises
and treated the amalgam as a future performance warranty. Under
the Standard Alliance Industries approach, a buyer's cause of action on
a new product warranty accrues when the buyer discovered or
should have discovered the non-conformity.
B. Special Rules for Contracts with Exclusive Repair Remedies
The dominant approach and the Standard Alliance Industries ap-
proach both incorrectly analyze section 2-725's application to war-
ranties with exclusive repair remedies. Neither approach accounts
for section 2-719's impact on a buyer's right to enforce his claim in
court. Section 2-71934 expressly sanctions contract provisions mak-
ing repair or replacement of defective parts the buyer's exclusive
remedy for breach. If the contract contains such a provision, the
buyer must submit to cure before seeking a legal remedy. Section
2-719 provides, however, that if an exclusive repair remedy "fails of
its essential purpose," Article II remedies are automatically
applicable.
An exclusive repair remedy fails of its essential purpose when-
ever the seller cannot correct serious product malfunctions within a
reasonable time or otherwise materially defaults on performing the
31 For correct § 2-725 analysis of contracts with exclusive repair remedies, see text ac-
companying notes 34-48 infra.
32' 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978).
33 Id. at 821 n.17.
34 U.C.C. § 2-719 (1977) provides, in part, as follows:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of
the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution
for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages
recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the
goods and repayment of the price or to repair or replacement of non-conforming
goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly
agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
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repair promise.3 5 If the parties have made repair or replacement of
defective parts the buyer's exclusive contractual remedy, the seller
must have an opportunity to correct malfunctions. The buyer can-
not sue for breach of warranty until the defect has been brought to
the seller's attention and has remained unrepaired. At this point,
the exclusive repair remedy has failed of its essential purpose, and
section 2-719(2) activates the buyer's right to seek legal remedies.
Courts adopting time-of-tender or time-of-discovery accrual
dates for actions on exclusive repair remedy contracts fail to appre-
ciate the relationship between sections 2-719 and 2-725. Conse-
quently, their accrual treatment violates the generally accepted
doctrine that a limitations act will not run against a party until he is
privileged to maintain an action.3 6 Since section 2-725's language
does not reject this principle, courts should hold that a buyer's
cause of action under an exclusive repair remedy contract accrues
when repair fails and the buyer can sue.
Section 2-725(1) contains conventional limitations act lan-
guage: "[A]n action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued."
Section 1-201(1) defines "actions" as "proceedings in which rights
are determined. " 37 After substituting section 1-201's definition of
"actions," section 2-725(1) becomes: "A]n action for breach of any
contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the
cause for proceedings in which rights are determined has accrued."
Section 2-725(2) also mirrors conventional limitations act lan-
guage: "A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regard-
less of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach."
Although section 2-725(2) allocates the risk of delayed discovery to
the plaintiff, as traditional limitations acts commonly do, this sec-
tion presupposes the existence of an "aggrieved party." An "ag-
35 See, e.g.,Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250
(1972); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). "Failure
of essential purpose" is little more than a polite way of telling the seller that since he has
materially breached his repair promise, he can no longer claim it as a limitation on his
liability. In the days before Llewellyn coined this elegant phrase, courts employed material
breach analysis to this end. See, e.g., Becker Roofing Co. v. Carroll, 37 Ala. App. 385, 69 So.
2d 295 (1953); Mayfield v. George 0. Richardson Machine. Co., 208 Mo. App. 206, 231
S.W. 288 (1921). Even today, courts occasionally employ material breach analysis to back
up their failure of essential purpose holdings. See, e.g.,Jacobs, 125 Ga. App. at 468, 188
S.E.2d at 253; Adams v.J. I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 403, 261 N.E.2d 1, 7 (1970).
36 1 H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF AcTION § 118, at 616 (4th ed. 1916).
Numerous cases support the proposition that limitation does not begin to run until a right
to sue arises. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Nieft, 313 Ill. App. 354, 356, 40 N.E.2d 554, 555 (1942);
Neal v. Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Mo. App. 1974); Bowman v. Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co., 385 P.2d 440, 445 (Okla. 1963).
37 U.C.C. § 1-201(l) (1977) states in full: " 'Action' in the sense of a judicial proceed-
ing includes recoupment, counterclaim, set-off, suit in equity, and any other proceeding in
which rights are determined."
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grieved party" is defined as a "party entitled to a remedy."3 8 In an
exclusive repair remedy contract, the buyer does not become an
"aggrieved party" until after the remedy has failed and he is enti-
tled to sue.
These definitions overwhelmingly indicate that no premature
starting of the section 2-725 limitatons period was contemplated
for exclusive repair remedy contracts. Why then have most courts
adopted a time-of-tender accrual date for contracts with provisions
such as the new product warranty?
The answer lies in the courts' failure to recognize that an ex-
clusive-repair-remedy seller who cannot correct the non-com-
formity has actually breached the contract twice. Failing to
appreciate the dual nature of the seller's breach, courts have at-
tempted to resolve the controversy under section 2- 7 25(2)'s special
warranty accrual rules. This section limits the courts to either a
time-of-delivery or a time-of-discovery accrual date.
The standard new equipment warranty, however, embodies
two distinct legal obligations: (1) a warranty that the goods are free
from defects in material and workmanship; and (2) a promise to
repair part failures.3 9 The second promise represents an ordinary
38 "Remedy" is defined expansively under § 1-201(34) and means "any remedial right
to which an aggrieved party is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal." Because the
seller's repair promise is the promise of a remedy and remedies include nonjudicial as well
as judicial ones, it might be argued that a buyer under exclusive repair remedy contracts
becomes an "aggrieved party" as soon as the product fails. This would result in § 2-725's
abandonment of the orthodox doctrine that limitation does not run against a party until he
acquires a right to maintain suit in court. Such a reading should be rejected. "Aggrieved
party" appears here in the context of a limitations act that is adopting rules for when
"causes of action" (i.e., causes for proceedings) accrue. The § 2-725 context narrows the
meaning of "remedy" and causes an "aggrieved party" under § 2-725 to mean a party who
is entitled to a judicial remedy.
39 Where the contract contains both a warranty and repair remedy, the § 2-725 limita-
tion period should run separately on each breach. Standard Alliance Indus., Inc. v. Black
Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 822 (6th Cir. 1978); Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 948, 111 Cal. Rptr. 210, 216-18 (1973). See also Kan-
ovitz, supra note 27; Note, supra note 27, at 723-24 n.41. Most courts, however, have en-
tirely overlooked this possibility in their limitations analysis. See note 27 supra. Moreover,
one court, Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich App. 169, 253 N.W.2d 696
(1977), flatly declined to accord separate limitations treatment for the repair promise and
the underlying warranty. The court's explanation, that it would indefinitely extend limita-
tions, is unsound. Where the seller both warrants the goods and agrees to repair part fail-
ures for one year as the buyer's sole remedy, any breach of the latter promise will occur
during the first year; claims brought more than four years thereafter accordingly will be
time-barred. Consequently, no indefinite extension of limitations will result.
Sellers sometimes use an abbreviated version of the standard new product warranty, see
text accompanying note 26 supra, in which a repair remedy is promised but no affirmations
are made about the goods. Where the seller's promise to repair is unaccompanied by an
express warranty, this promise operates as a remedy for breaches of Article II implied war-
ranties. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1977). That the warranty is implied does not affect the
position taken in this article. The buyer's claim on the broken repair promise should accrue
when that promise is broken, see text accompanying note 40 infra, while § 2-725's operation
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contractual commitment and not a warranty. If the goods malfunc-
tion during the promised repair period and the seller cannot cor-
rect the problem, the seller has now committed two breaches:
initially a breach of warranty and later a breach of an ordinary con-
tractual promise. Furthermore, the exclusive repair remedy has
failed of its essential purpose; this remedial failure entitles the
buyer, for the first time, to litigate the claim.
1. Buyer's Claim For Breach of Repair Promise
To avoid starting the section 2-725 limitations period before
the exclusive-repair-remedy buyer can sue, courts should view a
broken repair promise as an ordinary contract breach. The relevant
accrual language for such a contract breach is found in section 2-
725(2)'s first sentence, rather than in the section's second sentence
covering warranty breaches. Section 2- 7 25's first sentence pro-
vides: "A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs . . .40
Thus, a buyer's claim on a broken repair promise should accrue
only after the repair remedy has failed and the buyer may litigate
the claim.
2. Buyer's Claim For Breach of Warranty
If an exclusive repair remedy fails of its essential purpose and
the buyer claims a breach of warranty, the buyer may still find relief
under section 2-725. 4 1 Under settled principles of limitations act
interpretation, an exclusive repair remedy should suspend the run-
ning of limitations on the underlying warranty claim until "failure
of essential purpose" activates the buyer's right to seek a judicial
remedy.
Traditional limitations act analysis postpones accrual of a claim
on the underlying implied warranty should be suspended until failure of essential purpose
privileges the buyer to sue, see text accompanying notes 41-48 infra.
40 U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1977). Some contracts obligate the seller to repair the product
but fail to make this the buyer's exclusive remedy for breach of warranty. Resort to repairs
is optional unless the buyer's contract expressly makes this remedy exclusive. U.C.C. § 2-
719(l)(b) (1977). Even so, courts should accord separate accrual treatment to the repair
promise and underlying warranty. See Note, supra note 27. However, because resort to a
non-exclusive repair remedy is optional with the buyer, such a remedy would not be effec-
tive to suspend running of the statute of limitations on the buyer's underlying breach of
warranty claim. Thus, the non-exclusive repair remedy buyer's claim on the repair promise
should accrue when that promise is broken, while his claim on the underlying warranty
should accrue, in accordance with the second sentence of § 2-725(2). See text accompany-
ing notes 17-25 supra.
41 Since the seller's warranty and his repair promise represent separately breached con-
tractual undertakings, courts should accord each separate accrual treatment. See note 39
supra. The exclusive repair remedy buyer's decision to sue for breach of warranty instead of
for breach of the repair remedy promise should not affect his remedies under Article II.
The Code adopts a policy of liberal administration of remedies to put the aggrieved party in
as good a position as if the other had fully performed. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1977).
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subject to a condition precedent until the condition occurs.42 This
condition precedent doctrine is a specific application of the general
doctrine that normally limitations will not run against a party until
he is privileged to sue. Courts frequently apply the condition pre-
cedent rule to contracts with arbitration clauses or other specified
administrative remedies. When a contract contains such a provi-
sion, the limitations period runs only after the required procedures
have been completed or waived.
43
Article III of the U.C.C. recognizes the condition precedent
principle. Section 3-802 provides that, subject to specified
exceptions:
[W]here an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation
• . . the obligation is suspended pro tanto until the instrument
is due or if it is payable on demand until its presentment. If the
instrument is dishonored action may be maintained on either
the instrument or the obligation . . .44
The comments clarify the phrase "the obligation is suspended":
By this it is normally meant that taking the instrument is a sur-
render of the right to sue on the obligation until the instrument
is due, but if the instrument is not paid on due presentment the
right to sue on the obligation is "revived." Subsection (1)(b)
states this result in terms of suspension of the obligation, which
is intended to include suspension of the running of the statute of
limitations.45
The taking of a negotiable instrument suspends the running of
limitations on the underlying debt because the holder impliedly
agrees to forego legal action until the instrument is dishonored.
46
The relationship between a seller's repair promise and the underly-
42 See Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, (1967) (limitations period
runs on a contract requiring administrative review of disputes only after required proceed-
ings have ended); Butler v. Local Union 823, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1975) (employee's
cause of action under collective bargaining agreement accrues only after the required griev-
ance steps have been taken); Ginn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 417 F.2d 119 (5th Cir.
1969) (where contract requires accounting or some other act before obligation for payment
arises, cause of action for labor and services does not accrue until these acts have been
performed); see also 1 H. WOOD, supra note 36, at § 119.
43 See Beavers v. Pacific Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 85 Ga. App. 240, 68 S.E.2d 717 (1952);
Kilbreath v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 401 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see also 14
G. CoucH, ON INSURANCE 2d § 50:51 (rev. ed. 1982). These cases demonstrate that when a
contract imposes mandatory nonjudicial dispute resolution machinery, limitation does not
run against a party while he is resorting to the required process and before, by the terms of
the agreement, he can maintain action in court.
44 U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b) (1977).
45 U.C.C. § 3-802 comment 3 (1977) (emphasis added).
46 Section 3-507(1) (1977) provides that:
(1) An instrument is dishonored when
(a) a necessary or optional presentment is duly made and due acceptance or
payment is refused or cannot be obtained within the prescribed time or in case of
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ing warranty is analogous to the relationship between the negotia-
ble instrument and the underlying debt. A contractual repair
clause gives the seller a right to attempt cure before the buyer may
sue. Thus, under an exclusive repair remedy contract, resort to
cure and the subsequent failure of cure are made conditions prece-
dent to litigation.
Although section 2-725 does not refer to the condition prece-
dent doctrine, the Code contains two sources of authority for the
doctrine's application. First, section 1-103 provides that, unless
specifically preempted, "the principles of law and equity . . . shall
supplement. . . [the Code's] provisions." 47 Because section 2-725
neither expressly nor impliedly rejects the condition precedent
doctrine, the doctrine can be applied to section 2-725 through sec-
tion 1-103. Second, section 2-725(4) specifies that section 2-725
does not alter the law on tolling. Incorporation of extracode tolling
law was intended to avoid a mechanical application of section 2-
725's time-bar rules.48 Section 2-725(4) thus represents a second
basis for applying the condition precedent doctrine to warranties
with exclusive repair remedies.
Different arguments, however, must be raised by a buyer who
voluntarily cooperated in a repair solution, and later found that the
seller could not cure and that a time-bar had fallen on the claim.
C. Estoppel to Assert Section 2-725
The estoppel doctrine is rooted in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. Originally known as equitable estoppel or estoppel in
bank collections the instrument is seasonably returned by the midnight deadline
(section 4-301); or
(b) presentment is excused and the instrument is not duly accepted or paid.
47 U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977) reads in full:
Unless displaced by particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and eq-
uity, including the law of merchants and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions.
48 U.C.C. § 2-725(4) provides that "[t]his section does not alter the law on tolling of
the statute of limitations .... ." Courts, if so disposed, could rely on this section to give
effect to the condition precedent rule. "Tolling" does not have a precise legal meaning.
Compare Bomba v. W. L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 1978) ("Tolling,
strictly speaking, is concerned with the point at which the limitations period begins to run
and with circumstances in which the running of the limitations period may be suspended.")
with Hamilton v. Pearce, 15 Wash. App. 133, 137-38, 547 P.2d 866, 870 (1976) (To "toll"
the statute of limitations means to show any facts which remove its bar against the action,
including facts which start the statute anew.). Some courts, when analyzing the impact of a
condition precedent, speak in terms of "tolling" the statute. See, e.g., Sherar v. Harless, 561
F.2d 791, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1977); Chicago & N.W. R.R. v. United States, 453 F.2d 759, 763
(Ct. Cl. 1972). Consequently courts could use § 2-725(4), as an alternative to § 1-103, as
the vehicle for postponing accrual of the buyer's claim until the exclusive repair remedy
fails of its essential purpose.
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pais,49 the doctrine required a misstatement of a past or present
fact. This doctrine's successor, promissory estoppel, has become
"the most radical and expansive development" 50 in contract law
during this century. Promissory estoppel requires justifiable reli-
ance on another's promise followed by a reasonable and foresee-
able change of position.5' In many jurisdictions, promissory
estoppel has replaced the doctrine's older form.5 2
Section 90 of the First Restatement of Contracts55 contributed
to the expansion of promissory estoppel beyond its original limited
role as a substitute for consideration. 54 Today, detrimental reliance
on a promise compensates for deficiencies in mutual agreement 55
and for the absence of statute of frauds formalities. 56 In addition,
the estoppel doctrine has for many years prevented the unjust use
of a limitations defense.5 7  Promissory estoppel is frequently ap-
49 Under the classic formulation, six elements are required for equitable estoppel:
1) There must be acts or language amounting to a misrepresentation or conceal-
ment of a material fact;
2) The truth concerning this fact must be known to the party to be estopped;
3) The truth must be unknown to the other party;
4) The conduct must be done with the expectation that it will be acted upon by
the other party;
5) The conduct must in fact be relied upon;
6) The other party must act upon it in such manner as to alter his position for the
worse.
See 3J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EqUiTYJURISPRUDENCE § 805, at 191-92 (5th ed. 1941).
50 Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 52, 53 (1981).
51 See notes 49-53 supra and infra and accompanying text.
52 For an excellent general discussion, see Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional
Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE LJ. 343 (1969).
53 Section 90 reads: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to in-
duce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the prom-
isee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
Section 90 of the Second Restatement principally modifies the remedies available for
breach of promises binding because of reliance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 90 (in particular comment d).
54 For recent developments in promissory estoppel, see generally Henderson, supra
note 52; Knapp, supra note 50.
55 See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958) (contrac-
tor's reliance on subcontractor's bid makes bid an irrevocable offer); Wheeler v. White, 398
S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965) (substantial and foreseeable reliance actionable even though the
agreement relied on would have been unenforceable for indefiniteness under traditional
contract doctrine); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267
(1965) (damages recoverable for detrimental reliance on preliminary negotiations not yet
an offer).
56 See Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950) (oral promise to
devise real estate); McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970) (oral promise
of employment for more than one year); Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274
N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979) (oral promise to sell quantity of grain in excess of $500). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981).
57 Professor Dawson, writing in 1935, noted that "recognition of estoppel as a ground
for suspension of limitation acts has encountered remarkably little resistance in American
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plied in settlement negotiations cases. In mostjurisdictions a party,
who has induced his adversary to delay legal action in the expecta-
tion of settlement, may be estopped from asserting a statute of limi-
tations defense if that party breaks off negotiations and denies
liability after the limitations period has expired.
58
A few jurisdictions, however, still apply the legal standards for
equitable estoppel. These courts require that the plaintiff's delay
be the result of deliberate misrepresentation or intentional decep-
tion on the part of the defendant. 59 Nevertheless, the majority of
law." Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes of Limitation, 34 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1935). This role for
the doctrine long antedates its application as a basis for the preclusion of statute of frauds
defenses. See, e.g., Charles Weitz's Sons v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 206 Iowa
1025, 219 N.W. 411 (1928); Chapin v. Merrill, 4 Wend. (N.Y.) 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830).
The widespread acceptance of this application is manifested by the fact that RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment a, illustration 3 (1981), is taken from McLearn v.
Hill, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N.E. 617 (1931) (a case where the defendant was estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations because he induced the plaintiff to discontinue legal
action).
58 See, e.g., Bomba v. W. L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067 (7th Cir. 1978); City of Bed-
ford v. James Leffel & Co., 558 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1977); Shinabarger v. United Aircraft
Corp., 381 F.2d 808 (2d. Cir. 1967); Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. Envirotech Corp.,
524 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1981); Doherty v. Hartford Ins. Group, 58 Hawaii 570, 574
P.2d 132 (1978); Cassidy v. Luburich, 49 Ill. App. 3d 596, 364 N.E.2d 315 (1977); Charles
Weitz's Sons v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 206 Iowa 1025, 219 N.W. 411 (1928);
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Wilson, 190 Kan. 7, 372 P.2d 551 (1962); Carroll County Memorial
Hosp. v. Yocum, 489 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1972); MacKeen v. Kasinskas, 333 Mass. 695, 132
N.E.2d 732 (1956); Huhtala v. Travelers Ins. Co., 401 Mich. 118, 257 N.W.2d 640 (1977);
Izard v. Mikell, 173 Miss. 770, 163 So. 498 (1935); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Budd,
185 Neb. 343, 175 N.W.2d 621 (1970); Nowell v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 250 N.C. 575,
108 S.E.2d 889 (1959); Biocraft Lab., Inc. v. USM Corp., 163 N.J. Super. 570, 395 A.2d 521
(1978); Loomis Constr. Co. v. Matijevich, 425 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
59 See, e.g., Groseth v. Ness, 421 P.2d 624, 631, 632 nn.23, 25 (Alaska 1966); Associated
Transp., Inc. v. General Expressways, Inc., 37 Misc. 446, 447, 238 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1962); Doner v.Jowitt & Rodgers Co., 299 Pa. Super. Ct. 492,497, 445 A.2d 1237,
1239 (1982). Because most estoppel claimants are lulled into delaying action by promises
and assurances that an amicable settlement will be reached, the estoppel normally growing
out of settlement negotiations has'promissory characteristics. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.3, at 42-43 (1973). Thus, when equitable estoppel is applied in its
traditional form, see note 49 supra, as the exclusive legal theory for protecting reliance on
settlement negotiations, the estoppel claimant rarely prevails.
Courts holding for estoppel claimants frequently have been unaware of the promissory
character of the estoppel they have applied and have misstated the theory, see State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Budd, 185 Neb. 343, 347-48, 175 N.W.2d 621, 624 (1970); Nowell v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 250 N.C. 575, 579, 108 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1959); Turner v. Tur-
ner, 582 P.2d 600, 602-03 (Wyo. 1978), or refrained from stating it at all, see McCloskey &
Co. v. Dickenson, 56 A.2d 442, 444-45 (D.C. 1947). Confused terminology in this area
probably stems from the fact that this application of estoppel evolved before promissory
estoppel was articulated as a distinct legal doctrine. See note 57 supra. Under the pretext of
applying equitable estoppel, earlier cases often rejected limitations defenses because of the
defendant's assurances that an amicable settlement would be reached. Modern courts have
begun to appreciate the promissory character of these estoppel cases and are now using
appropriate terminology. See, e.g., Shinabarger v. United Aircraft Corp., 381 F.2d 808, 811




courts do not require misrepresentation or deception for estop-
pel,60 and this requirement should certainly not apply to Code-cov-
ered transactions. Despite a good faith cure attempt, a seller would
violate section 1-203's requirement of fair dealing if, after inducing
the buyer to rely and to delay suit, he then asserted section 2-725
when the repairs failed.
Section 1-203 imposes a duty of good faith in the performance
and enforcement of contract obligations. Good faith for a
merchant includes honesty and the observance of reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing.61 A seller who invites reliance
must comply with commercial standards of decency. Thus, having
induced the buyer to delay and to incur a time-bar, the seller who
cannot make the goods conform to the warranty should not deny
liability.62
Courts deciding commercial disputes should adopt the prevail-
ing approach to estoppel in settlement negotiation cases.63 Thus,
the buyer should prevail over a seller's section 2-725 defense by
proving that reasonable reliance on the seller's conduct and
promises caused the buyer to delay action until the buyer could not
maintain his claim.64
60 See note 58 supra.
61 U.C.C. § 2-103(I)(b) (1977).
62 Professors White and Summers, endorsing the application of promissory estoppel to
override § 2-210 defenses, find support for this application both in § 1-103's incorporation
of supplemental bodies of law and in the § 1-203 duty of good faith. After quoting from
§ 1-203, they write: "The foregoing provisions authorize the use of estoppel concepts
against a party who unjustifiably misleads another party, however innocently. These provi-
sions may also be used to combat the defendant who otherwise acts in bad faith or fraudu-
lently in setting up the statute as a defense." WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 2-6, at 70.
See also Potter v. Hatter Farms, Inc., 56 Ore. 254, 262, 641 P.2d 628, 633 (1982) ("Allowing
promissory estoppel as an exception to the Statute of Frauds is consistent with the obliga-
tion of good faith.").
63 See note 58 supra.
64 No court applying § 2-725 has flatly refused to entertain an estoppel argument.
When buyers have argued estoppel, courts have either accepted and applied the doctrine,
see City of Bedford v.James Leffel & Co., 558 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1977); Colorado-Ute Elec.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Envirotech Corp., 524 F. Supp 1152 (D. Colo. 1981); Biocraft Laboratories,
Inc. v. USM Corp., 163 NJ. Super. 570, 395 A.2d 521 (1978), or have recognized the doc-
trine but found it inapplicable on the facts, see Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson
Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Ontario Hydro v. Zallea
Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Del. 1983); Tomes v. Chrysler Corp., 61111. App. 3d 707,
377 N.E.2d 224 (1978); Neal v. Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974);
Jandreau v. Sheesley Plumbing & Heating Co., 324 N.W.2d 266 (S.D. 1982). With one
exception, courts in § 2-725 cases have been content with proof that the buyer reasonably
relied on the seller's curative promises and have not required buyers to establish the tradi-
tional elements for equitable estoppel. The court inJandreau, 324 N.W.2d. at 272, rejected
the buyer's estoppel claim because the seller was not guilty of "intentionally misleading him
into not asserting his legal rights." This court placed too heavy a burden on the buyer.
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1. Introduction of Estoppel into Section 2-725 Jurisprudence
The U.C.C. contains two provisions that support a buyer's
promissory estoppel argument in a limitations case: section 1-103
and section 2-725(4). As discussed below, section 1-103 provides
the more promising approach.
Section 1-10365 provides that principles of law and equity-in-
cluding estoppel-supplement the Code provisions and that such
principles apply unless specifically displaced by a U.C.C. provi-
sion. 66 The widespread recognition of estoppel in section 2-201
statute of frauds cases67 affords a compelling argument to apply es-
toppel in section 2-725 statute of limitations cases. Section 2-201
and section 2-725 reflect a similar policy concern for the reliability
of the evidence used against a defendant.68 One statute regulates
the form evidence must take; the other bars suits based on "stale"
claims. In statute of frauds cases, the courts often subordinate the
policy of eliminating unreliable evidence to the policy of protecting
justifiable reliance. Therefore, courts should adopt the same prior-
ity for cases involving the statute of limitations and the timeliness of
a suit.
The support for a promissory estoppel bar against a section 2-
725 defense is more persuasive than for a section 2-201 defense.
Section 2-201 lists various methods to satisfy the need for reliable
evidence; several of these methods attribute legal significance to a
party's detrimental reliance. 69 Arguably, therefore, section 2-201
65 For the text of § 1-103, see note 47 supra.
66 Courts have applied estoppel defenses in a variety of U.C.C. contexts aside from
§§ 2-201 and 2-725. See, e.g., Mercanti v. Persson, 160 Conn. 468, 280 A.2d 137 (1971)
(estoppel precludes buyer who misinformed seller about insurance coverage from claiming
risk of loss was on seller, § 2-509(3),(4)); Jenkins & Boller Co. v. Schmidt Iron Works, 36
Ill. App. 3d 1044, 344 N.E.2d 275 (1976) (estoppel makes offer irrevocable, §§ 2-205, 2-
206); First Ga. Bank v. Webster, 168 Ga. App. 307, 308 S.E.2d 579 (1983) (estoppel pre-
cludes depository bank from exercising charge back rights where it misadvised customer
that deposited check had cleared, § 4-212).
67 While acceptance of promissory estoppel in § 2-201 cases was originally mixed, com-
pare Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 543 (N.D.
Miss. 1978); G. C. Campbell & Sons v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)
with Jenkins & Boller Co. v. Schmidt Iron Works, 36 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 344 N.E.2d 275
(1976), the recent trend is now markedly favorable. See, e.g., Allen M. Campbell Co. v.
Virginia Metal Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1983); Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764
(Colo. 1983) (promissory estoppel here applied to overcome § 8-319 statute of frauds de-
fense). See generally Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Section 2-201 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 26 VILL. L. REV. 63 (1980).
68 The title of the original English Statute of Frauds, 30 Car. ch. 3, 8 Stat. at Large 405
(1676), "An Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries," reveals the legislative pur-
pose. A signed written memorandum was required as a safeguard against fabricated testi-
mony. Limitations acts exhibit a related concern that testimony allowed to grow "stale"
ceases to be reliable. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
69 Section 2-201(3)(a) most clearly reflects the policy of protecting detrimental reli-
ance. This section provides that an agreement is enforceable despite the lack of a writing
[Vol. 60:318
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
fully codifies the type of proof acceptable to overcome the lack of
statutory formalities. Such an exhaustive list conceivably could pre-
clude the use of common law doctrines through section 1-103 to
ameliorate hardships caused by the statute of frauds. 70
In contrast, section 2-725 establishes a harsh doctrine with
only one method to avoid the statute's application: timely suit.
Section 2-725(4)71 however, incorporates extracode tolling law.
Although tolling and estoppel technically represent different legal
devices to overcome a time-bar, 72 section 2-725(4) belies any statu-
tory intent to displace extracode mitigating doctrines.
Moreover, far less friction with statutory policy results from ap-
plying estoppel in section 2-725 cure cases than in section 2-201
statute of frauds cases. With a statute of frauds defense, protecting
a buyer's justifiable reliance on the seller's oral promise may sacri-
fice section 2-201's concern for the reliability of the evidence. 73
Limitations act policy, however, need not be similarly compromised
to protect a buyer's reliance on the seller's cure promises. Notice
from the buyer within the limitations period of a continuing contro-
where the seller substantially begins or makes commitments to procure goods that are to be
specially manufactured for the buyer and are unsuitable for sale to others in the ordinary
course of the seller's business. Reliance is also a factor underlying § 2-201(3)(c) which
makes oral contracts enforceable with respect to goods for which payment has been made
or which have been received and accepted. The Code, however, in both situations protects
reliance only when protection is compatible with the statute of frauds' important eviden-
tiary function. With specially manufactured goods, the seller who fails to obtain a memo-
randum is protected only when he begins manufacture "under circumstances which
reasonably indicate that the goods are for the particular buyer." Unlike § 4 of the Uniform
Sales Act, § 2-201(3)(c) treats payment for or acceptance of goods as grounds only for
partial enforcement of the contract on the theory that such behavior constitutes an unam-
biguous admission only of a contract for that quantity in fact paid for or accepted. U.C.C.
§ 2-201 comment 2 (1977).
70 Some courts have rejected the application of promissory estoppel to § 2-201 because
they view the statutory alternatives to a memorandum intended as an exhaustive list of
situations where oral contracts for the sale of goods for a price of $500 or more are en-
forceable. Section 2-201 is viewed as a comprehensive displacement of extracode mitigating
doctrines. See, e.g., C. R. Fredrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 858 (9th Cir.
1977); Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 111, 289 So. 2d 609, 613 (1974); G. C. Campbell & Son v.
Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
71 Section 2-725(4) (1977) reads: "This section does not alter the law on tolling of the
statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this
Act becomes effective."
72 See text accompanying notes 84-98 infra.
73 Disregard for § 2-201's evidentiary function is illustrated by the numerous decisions
holding that a grain elevator's resale of grain in reliance on a farmer's verbal promise over-
comes the lack of a writing. See, e.g., Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339
(Iowa 1979); Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976);Jamestown
Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1976); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Lyle,
90 S.D. 86, 238 N.W.2d 290 (1976). The grain elevator's resale of grain to a third party
does not confirm or furnish reliable evidence of the existence of an alleged verbal agree-
ment with any particular supplier. Protection for the elevator's reliance is accomplished
only by sacrificing § 2-201's evidentiary function.
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versy ensures that the seller would not have to defend a suit after
having reasonably destroyed the records. 74 Once notified, the
seller probably will gather and preserve evidence and therefore will
neither be surprised nor prejudiced by a delayed suit.
Buyers with grounds for estoppel should cite section 1-103,
rather than section 2-725(4), as authority for this argument. Many
jurisdictions refuse to toll the section 2-725 statute of limitations75
or limitations statutes generally, 76 unless the legislature has ap-
proved the specific ground for tolling. A request to create a non-
statutory "tolling" exception may cause confusion and an
unnecessary rejection of the buyer's estoppel argument. Accord-
ingly, the buyer should base an estoppel argument upon section
-1-103.
74 In City of Bedford v. James Leffel & Co., 558 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1977), the court set
forth an unassailable analysis for incorporating estoppel defenses into § 2-725 jurispru-
dence. The court stated:
Our conclusion that this may be a proper case for application of the doctrine
[of estoppel] . . . is bolstered by the fact that such application would in no way
frustrate the purpose of the statute of limitations. "Statutes of limitation are stat-
utes of repose . . . designed to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from being
asserted after a great lapse of time, to the surprise of the parties, when the evi-
dence may have been lost.... " Street v. Consumers Mining Corporation, (1946) 185
Va. 561, 575, 39 S.E.2d 271, 277. A four-year period and "time of breach" rule of
U.C.C. § 2-725 were designed "to fix a reasonable time after which merchants and
manufacturers could destroy their records with respect to the manufacture and
sale of an item without fear of being unable to defend against liabilities subse-
quently asserted." Engelman v. Eastern Light Co., Inc., (1962) 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 38, 1
U.C.C. Rep 187, 192. See U.C.C. § 2-725, Draftsmen's Comment. However,
where an item fails to perform satisfactorily immediately after the sale and the
parties engage in extensive and continuing efforts to correct the malfunction, it is
unlikely that the pertinent records will be destroyed. Certainly the vendor in such
cases cannot claim to have been unfairly surprised when the buyer files suit after it
has become clear that the repair efforts will not succeed.
Our conclusion is also reinforced by the belief that refusal to apply the doc-
trine in cases such as this may encourage premature resort to the courts. Where,
as here, a product has been specially designed to meet the buyer's requirements,
"start-up" problems are more likely than with more standardized goods. In most
cases the manufacturer can correct such problems if given an opportunity to do so.
However, a rule that the period of limitations runs from the date of delivery re-
gardless of any repair efforts by the seller would tend to discourage the buyer from
providing him that opportunity. In this day of crowded court dockets, reasonable
patience should be encouraged in such cases, not discouraged.
Id. at 219-20 n.18 (emphasis in original). See also text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
75 See, e.g., Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); City of Bedford v.James Leffel & Co., 558 F.2d 216 (4th
Cir. 1977); Binkley Corp. v. Teledyne Mid-Am. Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. Mo. 1971),
a ffd, 460 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972); see also Neal v. Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716 (Mo.
App. 1974).
76 See, e.g., Lamb v. Amalgamated Labor Life Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir.
1979); Sanchez v. South Hoover Hosp., 18 Cal. 3d 93, 553 P.2d 1129, 132 Cal. Rptr. 657
(1976); see also 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 2011 (1938 rev. ed.).
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2. The Limitations of Promissory Estoppel
Acceptance of promissory estoppel to avoid section 2-725,
however, does not represent a panacea for buyers. First, the doc-
trine will rarely benefit the buyer of a product that fails at the out-
set. On the one hand, few buyers will endure four years of product
failure and bungled cure attempts; on the other hand, few sellers
will endlessly repair a product to retain customer goodwill. Estop-
pel will arise only when the seller's corrective efforts extend beyond
or end shortly before the normal limitations period. If sufficient
time remains to bring an action after the seller abandons repair ef-
forts or after a reasonable buyer should have rejected any future
cure attempt, a buyer's failure to sue within the remaining time will
bar him from claiming estoppel.77 In effect, the seller's estopping
behavior must persist until the buyer suffers an injurious change of
position.
Consistent with Article II's philosophy, courts evaluating the
sufficiency of the time remaining after the failure of cure should
distinguish sophisticated commercial purchasers from ordinary
consumers. 78 In Standard Alliance Industries, Inc. v. Black Clawson
Co. ,79 the Sixth Circuit found that approximately four months was a
sufficient time remaining in the limitations period for a commercial
purchaser to consult a lawyer and file a claim.
Second, estoppel may not aid a buyer who has allowed repair
77 Estoppel requires an irretrievable detrimental change. See notes 49-54 supra and ac-
companying text. Consequently, a plaintiff may not assert estoppel if ample time remained
within which to institute suit before the limitations period expired. In the following cases,
the period remaining was deemed sufficient. Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson
Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979) (three and a half
months); Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Del. 1983) (over one
year); Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 125 NJ. Super. 251, 310 A.2d 491
(1973) (sixteen months); see also Krupa v. Kelley, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 127, 245 A.2d 886 (1968);
Bryant v. Bryant, 246 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1952); Luther v. Sohl, 186 Neb. 119, 181 N.W.2d
268 (1970).
78 Article II invites courts to apply a different standard for consumers than for busi-
nessmen in evaluating the timeliness of various required post-breach notices and actions.
For example, the drafters state:
The time of notification is to be determined by applying commercial standards to a
merchant buyer. "A reasonable time" for notification from a retail consumer is to
be judged by different standards so that in his case it will be extended, for the rule
requiring notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a
good faith consumer of his remedy.
U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4 (1977).
Courts have accepted this policy and have shown greater lenience to consumers who
have delayed taking required post-breach legal steps. Compare Economy Forms Corp. v.
Kandy, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 944, 950 (N.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 511 F.2d 1400 (5th
Cir. 1975) (in commercial settings between two businessmen, the reasonable time for re-
quired notices and actions will be fairly short), with Frontier Mobile Homes Sales, Inc. v.
Trigleth, 256 Ark. 101, 104, 505 S.W.2d 516, 517 (1974) (consumer should not be penal-
ized for continued patience with a seller who promises to cure a nonconforming delivery).
79 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978).
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attempts to continue too long. The buyer's reliance in delaying
legal action must be reasonable.80 Despite continuing repair at-
tempts, if a seller's repeated failure indicates or should have indi-
cated an incurable malfunction, the buyer takes a risk in further
indulging the seller.8 '
Finally, a product malfunction may cause consequential dam-
ages. 82 Defective goods may damage the buyer's other property or
lead to consequential business losses. The estoppel doctrine will
not help a buyer who, while waiting for the seller to correct the
product's defect, delays suing for consequential damages until
more than four years after such a damages claim accrues.83 Be-
cause the seller's assurances about repair do not lead the buyer to
believe that his other damages will be settled without a lawsuit, he
has no inducement to postpone the consequential damages claim.
Therefore, a buyer who fails to sue for consequential damages
within the normal four year limitations period will lose this portion
of the claim.
Granting limitations relief is most appealing when grounds for
estoppel exist. A buyer who has been lulled into a fatal delay by
unfulfilled assurances of cure certainly presents a compelling claim
for judicial sympathy. For buyers who cannot argue estoppel, sec-
tion 2-725(4), nevertheless, offers the possibility of tolling relief.
D. Repair Tolling
Significant procedural, as well as substantive, differences dis-
tinguish tolling from estoppel. 84 Tolling suspends the running of
80 See, e.g., Shinabarger v. United Aircraft Corp., 381 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1967); Klass v.
Detroit, 129 Mich. 35, 40, 88 N.W. 204, 206 (1901); Caledonia Sand & Gravel Co. v. Camp-
bell, 129 Vt. 182, 184-85, 260 A.2d 221, 222-23 (1969); McLaughlin v. Blake, 120 Vt. 174,
180, 136 A.2d 492, 496 (1957); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lane, 152 W. Va. 578, 584,
165 S.E.2d 379, 384 (1969); Turner v. Turner, 582 P.2d 600, 603 (Wyo. 1978).
81 Bowman v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 385 P.2d 440 (Okla. 1963).
82 U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1977) defines consequential damages as follows:
Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty.
83 See Louisville Silo & Tank Co. v. Thweatt, 174 Ark. 437, 295 S.W. 710 (1927); Mack
v. Hugh W. Comstock Assocs., 225 Cal. App. 2d 583, 37 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1964).
84 While estoppel is a common law doctrine, courts generally have required statutory
authorization before granting tolling relief. See notes 75, 76 supra and note 89 infra. Several
statutory grounds for tolling are common. Limitations acts generally are tolled if at the
time the cause of action accrues the aggrieved party is an infant, insane, or, under some
statutes, imprisoned. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-8 (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502
(1962); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.8 (West 1950); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 15-1-59, 15-1-61 (1972
& Supp. 1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-21 (West 1952 & Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 96 (West 1960); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15-2-22 (1984). The running of limitations
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the limitations statute while cure is ongoing.8 5 Estoppel, in con-
trast, operates only after the statutory period has expired.8 6 Estop-
pel focuses on the estopped party's defenses and does not interrupt
the limitations period. These prodedural distinctions may affect
the time remaining for the buyer to sue after the seller's repair at-
tempts fail.8 7 But the more important difference is the judicial en-
thusiasm that the buyer can anticipate for each of these arguments.
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to read a nonstatu-
tory tolling exception into a limitations act.88 This reluctance in-
creases when the asserted tolling ground arises after the limitations
period has already begun.8 9 Thus, courts frequently reason that
also normally is interrupted while the defendant is absent from the state, see, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 6-2-10 (1977); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-501 (1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-590
(West 1960 & Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-94 (1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-63
(1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.300 (1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-22 (West 1952); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 15-2-20 (1960 & Supp. 1983), or while he fraudulently conceals himself
to obstruct prosecution of the claim, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.051(c) (West 1982); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-3-96 (1982). Either with or without the aid of a statute, grounds for tolling
generally also exist where the defendant fraudulently conceals the existence of the cause of
action from the plaintiff. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-595 (West 1960); GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-3-96 (1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-67 (1972). See also Gieringer v. Silverman,
539 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 430 F.
Supp. 134 (D. Ala. 1977); Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644
P.2d 341 (1982). Beyond these grounds, no reliable generalizations can be made about
patterns in tolling statutes.
85 Bomba v. W. L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 1978).
86 Id.
87 Under a tolling analysis, the time the buyer lost waiting for cure is not counted as
part of his four year limitations period. If, for example, the seller attempted for nine
months to correct the malfunction, then the buyer may bring suit within four years and nine
months after the accrual of the cause of action and still be timely. Little judicial consensus
exists, however, about the period that the estoppel claimant may safely delay legal action
once the inducement for doing so has been withdrawn. The most common approach to
invoking estoppel requires the plaintiff to commence the action within a reasonable time
after the estopping circumstances cease to operate. See, e.g., Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp.,
523 F.2d 1367, 1370 (6th Cir. 1975); Van Hook v. Southern Cal. Waiters Alliance, 158 Cal.
App. 2d 556, 559, 323 P.2d 212, 219-20 (1958). In determining what amounts to a reason-
able time, courts often look to the applicable statute of limitations on the original claim
either as establishing a presumptively reasonable time for bringing legal action or as fixing
the maximum allowable period. See, e.g., In re Pieper's Estate, 224 Cal. App. 2d 670, 690, 37
Cal. Rptr. 46, 60 (1964); Van Hook, 158 Cal. App. 2d at 559, 323 P.2d at 219-220; Lazzaro v.
Kelley, 87 A.D.2d 975, 977, 450 N.Y.S.2d 102, 105 (1982); Nowell v. Great At. & Pac. Tea
Co., 250 N.C. 575, 579, 108 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1959); Duncan v. Gaffney Mfg. Co., 214 S.C.
502, 504-05, 53 S.E.2d 396, 396-97 (1949).
Some courts, however, have stated that the plaintiffs subsequent delay in bringing
legal action once an estoppel defense has been acquired will not prevent assertion of the
doctrine unless the defendant establishes laches, i.e., that the delay was unreasonable and
that the defendant suffered some detriment. See, e.g., Loomis Const. Co. v. Matijevich, 425
S.W.2d 39, 44 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); see also Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 629, 670 (1972). The
length of the buyer's delay after the failure of cure thus may be a factor influencing whether
he argues an estoppel or tolling theory. For an alternative theory when the buyer delays
too long, see note 98 infra.
88 See notes 75, 76 supra.
89 See Kingman's Committee v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 Ky. 404, 406, 55 S.W.2d 39, 40
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"once the statute of limitations begins to run, normally nothing will
stop or impede its operation."'90
Adopting this conservative attitude, courts both under the
common law of sales9 1 and under the Code92 have been remarkably
unsympathetic to buyers' requests to extend the limitations period
by the sellers' cure time. In rare cases, courts have tolled the limita-
tions statute while cure efforts are ongoing. These courts, however,
invariably have required not only repair efforts, but also assurances
from the seller that repair will be effective. 93 Thus qualified, the
repair tolling doctrine, if recognized at all, actually represents a
broader version of estoppel.94 Courts requiring assurances from
the seller emphasize the buyer's reasonable reliance in delaying ac-
tion, rather than the seller's use of a portion of the limitations pe-
riod. The buyer's reliance, although essential for estoppel, should
be irrelevant to tolling.
Judicial indifference to a request for tolling relief often results
from the buyer's failure to present convincing arguments. Article
(Ky. Ct. App. 1932); Fox v. Hudson's Ex'x, 150 Ky. 115, 121, 150 S.W. 49,52 (Ky. Ct. App.
1912); Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., 281 Md. 207, 210, 378 A.2d 1100, 1101-02 (1977).
This principle is occasionally imposed by statute. See, e.g., CALIF. CODE OF CIv. PROC. § 357
(West 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.360 (1983).
90 Valko Corp., 281 Md. 207, 210, 378 A.2d 1100, 1101 (1977).
91 See, e.g., Smith v. American Flange & Mfg. Co., 139 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Bishop-Babcock-Becker Co. v. Jennings 245 S.W. 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
92 See, e.g., Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456 (4th Cir.
1983); Triangle Underwiters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); Standard
Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923
(1979); City of Bedford v.James Leffel & Co., 558 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1977); Binkley Corp.
v. Teledyne Mid-Am. Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. Mo. 1971), arffd, 460 F.2d 276 (8th
Cir. 1972); Bobo v. Page Eng'g Co., 285 F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 395 F.2d 991
(3d Cir. 1968); Tomes v. Chrysler Corp., 60 Ill. App. 3d 707, 377 N.E.2d 224 (1978); Zahler
v. Star Steel Supply Co., 50 Mich. App. 386, 213 N.W.2d 269 (1973); Neal v. Laclede Gas
Co., 517 S.W.2d 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Thalrose v. General Motors Corp., 8 U.C.C.
Rptr. 1259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 971), aff'd mem., 41 A.D.2d 906, 343 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1973); Lewis
v. Jacobsen, 46 Erie L.J. 125, 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 623 (1962); Poppenheimer v. Bluff City
Motor Homes, 658 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
93 The need for assurances as a predicate for tolling antedates the adoption of the
U.C.C. See, e.g., Louisville Silo & Tank Co. v. Thweatt, 174 Ark. 437, 295 S.W. 710 (1927);
Southern Cal. Enters., Inc. v. D. N. & E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. Ct. App. 2d 750, 178 P.2d
785 (1947); Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257, 360
P.2d 897 (1961); Gaffney v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 49 Del. 381, 117 A.2d 237 (1955);
Styron v. Loman-Garrett Supply Co., 6 N.C. Ct. App. 675, 171 S.E.2d 41 (1969). Courts
uniformly have injected this requirement into § 2-725(4) when they have shown an inclina-
tion to "toll" at all. See, e.g., Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. Envirotech Corp., 524 F.
Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1981) (estoppel given as alternative holding); Little Rock School Dist.
v. Cetolex Corp., 264 Ark. 757, 574 S.W.2d 669 (1978); Biocraft Laboratories, Inc. v. USM
Corp., 163 N.J. Super. 570, 395 A.2d 521 (1978); Bowman v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co.,
385 P.2d 440 (Okla. 1963);
94 Several courts have noted that the lines between estoppel and tolling are effectively
blurred when express assurances that the problem will be corrected are required for "toll-
ing." See City of Bedford v.James Leffel & Co., 558 F.2d 216, 218 n.13 (4th Cir. 1977); A.
J. Aberman, Inc. v. Funk Bldg. Corp., 278 Pa. Super. 385, 402, 420 A.2d 594, 602 (1980).
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II, nevertheless, contains an inherent rationale for allowing tolling
relief. As previously discussed, the U.C.C. emphasizes informal re-
pair solutions to an extent unprecedented under prior law. Article
II contains numerous mechanisms to encourage, and sometimes to
compel, buyers to undergo cure before pursuing legal remedies. 95
In addition, Article II reassures the buyer that he will not lose im-
portant remedial rights by allowing cure if the seller cannot repair
the non-conformity. 96 Section 2-725 tests the limits of these statu-
tory assurances.
Granting tolling relief to buyers whose reasonable cure expec-
tations have gone unrealized does not conflict with the policies un-
derlying section 2-725. 97 A seller attempting repair is unlikely to
destroy records after four years if a controversy remains. More-
over, the seller's cure attempts may have consumed a significant
portion of the buyer's limitations period. Therefore, if a buyer has
given the seller the opportunity to cure the breach, the courts
should subordinate the seller's desire for transactional security, fi-
nality, and repose to the buyer's demand for transactional
fairness.98
95 See notes 7, 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
96 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
97 See notes 14-16, 74 supra and accompanying text.
98 When the seller fails to cure after assuring the buyer that he would, the buyer may
have one additional theory. The buyer should contend that the seller's post-breach cure
assurances operated as a contractual modification and when the seller broke this promise, a
second cause of action accrued. This argument is a first cousin to the one devised in Part II
(B) supra for exclusive repair remedy contracts. While no buyers have yet made this argu-
ment in a § 2-725 case, § 2-209(1) supplies the necessary foundation. Section 2-209(1)
dispenses with consideration for contractual modifications. Courts readily have enforced
claims arising from post-breach assurances of cure in other contexts. See, e.g., Southern
Concrete Prod. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ga. App. 534, 191 S.E.2d 314 (1972);Jones v. Abriani,
169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976); Morrison v. Devore Trucking, Inc., 68 Ohio
App. 2d 140, 428 N.E.2d 438 (1980); Ruble Forest Prod., Inc. v. Lancer Mobile Homes,
Inc., 269 Or. 315, 524 P.2d 1204 (1974); see also U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 7; R. NORDSTROM,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW Or SALES § 67, at 206 (1970). Treating the seller's cure promise as a
contractual modification should give the buyer the benefit of a second accrual date with
four more years to sue for this breach. See Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass
Corp., 706 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1983) (replacement of defective product by seller restarts the
limitations period). If the seller challenges the modification agreement under U.C.C. § 2-
209(3) because his cure promise was oral, the buyer has an adequate response. Section 2-
209(3) requires that the provisions of § 2-201 be satisfied only if "the contract as modified
is within its provisions." Because the goods had already been delivered and accepted
before the seller made this cure promise, the contract as modified was no longer within § 2-
201's provisions. See U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c) (1977). Consequently, neither consideration nor
a writing is required for a modification agreement entered into after the goods have been
delivered. Morrison v. Devore Trucking, Inc., 68 Ohio App. 2d 140, 142, 428 N.E.2d 438,
441 (1980).
Arguing that the seller's cure promise operates as a contractual modification, rather
than simply grounds for estoppel or tolling, eliminates several limitations problems buyers
might encounter under the other two doctrines. First, the buyer may have delayed bringing
legal action too long, after the failure of cure, to secure relief on the original warranty
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III. Conclusion
Section 2-725 jurisprudence has inadequately considered the
effect of lost cure time on the limitations period. Judicial insensitiv-
ity to Article II's cure policies has been most pronounced for con-
tracts with exclusive repair remedy provisions. Courts have
mechanically applied section 2-725(2) and have accrued a buyer's
cause of action under an exclusive repair remedy contract at a time
when the contract prevents suit. This article has established the
correct section 2-725 analysis for this common and commercially
important category of contracts. A buyer's cause of action under an
exclusive repair remedy contract should not accrue until the repair
remedy fails of its essential purpose and the buyer becomes privi-
leged to sue.
Buyers who voluntarily pursue cure before seeking a legal rem-
edy have two theories available to translate Article II's cure policies
into limitations relief. First, courts should invoke section 1-103 to
estop a seller, who assured a repair solution and persisted in cure
attempts until the buyer's claim was barred, from asserting a sec-
tion 2-725 defense against the buyer. Second, courts should afford
a buyer, who has given the seller ample opportunity to repair,
broad tolling protection under section 2-725(4). Courts should
prevent a seller from misusing a buyer's good faith indulgences and
therefore should reimburse the buyer for time lost while pursuing
cure. Subtracting lost cure time from the buyer's section 2-725 lim-
itations period would not be unfair to the seller; after all, the
seller's inability to cure caused the need for litigation. Greater sen-
sitivity to Article II cure policies in section 2-725 decisions will in-
crease reliance on repair solutions and will minimize losses in
commercial controversies.
breach even with the aid of estoppel or tolling. See note 87 supra; see also note 77 supra.
Claiming that the seller's promise to cure modified the contract extends the period four
years more. Second, this theory offers an alternative in jurisdictions where courts have
been unwilling to carve out nonstatutory tolling exceptions. See notes 75-76, 88-89 supra.
By contending that the seller's post breach assurances modified the contract and gave rise
to a second cause of action, the buyer avoids asking the court to toll.
If an unusually astute buyer foresees limitations problems when the seller requests an
opportunity to cure, the buyer can protect himself by requiring the seller to agree in writing
to waive limitations in the event his cure efforts fail. Such waiver agreements are not pro-
hibited by § 2-725(1). This section precludes agreements extending the limitations period
only when they are entered into as part of the original contracts. Courts traditionally have
been willing to enforce agreements waiving limitations defenses entered into after a breach.
See, e.g., Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Union Bank of
Switzerland v. HS Equities, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also 1A A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 218 (1963).
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